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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-948
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CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. and
ERNESTO PICHARDO, PETITIONERS v.
CITY OF HIALEAH
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 11, 1993]

  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court,
except as to Part II-A-2.
  The principle that government may not enact laws that
suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood
that few violations are recorded in our opinions.  Cf.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U. S. 67 (1953).  Concerned that this funda-
mental nonpersecution principle of the First Amendment
was implicated here, however, we granted certiorari.  503
U. S. ___ (1992).
  Our review confirms that the laws in question were
enacted by officials who did not understand, failed to
perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official
actions violated the Nation's essential commitment to reli-
gious freedom.  The challenged laws had an impermissible
object; and in all events the principle of general appli-
cability was violated because the secular ends asserted
in defense of the laws were pursued only with respect
to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.  We invalidate

the challenged enactments and reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
                            I
                            A
  This case involves practices of the Santeria religion,
which originated in the nineteenth century.  When hun-
dreds of thousands of members of the Yoruba people were
brought as slaves from eastern Africa to Cuba, their
traditional African religion absorbed significant elements
of Roman Catholicism.  The resulting syncretion, or fusion,
is Santeria, -the way of the saints.-  The Cuban Yoruba
express their devotion to spirits, called orishas, through
the iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic symbols are
often present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees
attend the Catholic sacraments.  723 F. Supp. 1467,
1469-1470 (SD Fla. 1989); 13 The Encyclopedia of Reli-
gion 66 (M. Eliade ed. 1987); 1 Encyclopedia of the
American Religious Experience 183 (C. Lippy & P. Wil-
liams eds. 1988).
  The Santeria faith teaches that every individual has a
destiny from God, a destiny fulfilled with the aid and
energy of the orishas.  The basis of the Santeria religion
is the nurture of a personal relation with the orishas, and
one of the principal forms of devotion is an animal
sacrifice.  13 The Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 66.
The sacrifice of animals as part of religious rituals has
ancient roots.  See generally 12 id., at 554-556.  Animal
sacrifice is mentioned throughout the Old Testament, see
14 Encyclopaedia Judaica 600, 600-605 (1971), and it
played an important role in the practice of Judaism before
destruction of the second Temple in Jerusalem, see id., at
605-612.  In modern Islam, there is an annual sacrifice
commemorating Abraham's sacrifice of a ram in the stead
of his son.  See C. Glass-, The Concise Encyclopedia of
Islam 178 (1989); 7 The Encyclopedia of Religion, supra,
at 456.
  According to Santeria teaching, the orishas are powerful
but not immortal.  They depend for survival on the
sacrifice.  Sacrifices are performed at birth, marriage, and
death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of
new members and priests, and during an annual celebra-
tion.  Animals sacrificed in Santeria rituals include
chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep,
and turtles.  The animals are killed by the cutting of the
carotid arteries in the neck.  The sacrificed animal is
cooked and eaten, except after healing and death rituals.
See 723 F. Supp., at 1471-1472; 13 The Encyclopedia of
Religion, supra, at 66; M. Gonz-lez-Wippler, The Santer-a
Experience 105 (1982).
  Santeria adherents faced widespread persecution in
Cuba, so the religion and its rituals were practiced in
secret.  The open practice of Santeria and its rites re-
mains infrequent.  See 723 F. Supp., at 1470; 13 The
Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 67; M. Gonz-lez-
Wippler, Santer-a: The Religion 3-4 (1989).  The religion
was brought to this Nation most often by exiles from the
Cuban revolution.  The District Court estimated that there
are at least 50,000 practitioners in South Florida today.
See 723 F. Supp., at 1470.

                            B
  Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
(Church), is a not-for-profit corporation organized under
Florida law in 1973.  The Church and its congregants
practice the Santeria religion.  The president of the
Church is petitioner Ernesto Pichardo, who is also the
Church's priest and holds the religious title of Italero, the
second highest in the Santeria faith.  In April 1987, the
Church leased land in the city of Hialeah, Florida, and
announced plans to establish a house of worship as well
as a school, cultural center, and museum.  Pichardo
indicated that the Church's goal was to bring the practice
of the Santeria faith, including its ritual of animal sacri-
fice, into the open.  The Church began the process of
obtaining utility service and receiving the necessary
licensing, inspection, and zoning approvals.  Although the
Church's efforts at obtaining the necessary licenses and
permits were far from smooth, see 723 F. Supp., at
1477-1478, it appears that it received all needed approv-
als by early August 1987.
  The prospect of a Santeria church in their midst was
distressing to many members of the Hialeah community,
and the announcement of the plans to open a Santeria
church in Hialeah prompted the city council to hold an
emergency public session on June 9, 1987.  The resolu-
tions and ordinances passed at that and later meetings
are set forth in the appendix following this opinion.
  A summary suffices here, beginning with the enactments
passed at the June 9 meeting.  First, the city council
adopted Resolution 87-66, which noted the -concern-
expressed by residents of the city -that certain religions
may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety,- and declared that
-[t]he City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition
against any and all acts of any and all religious groups
which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or
safety.-  Next, the council approved an emergency ordi-
nance, Ordinance 87-40, that incorporated in full, except
as to penalty, Florida's animal cruelty laws.  Fla. Stat.
ch. 828 (1987).  Among other things, the incorporated
state law subjected to criminal punishment -[w]hoever . . .
unnecessarily or cruelly . . . kills any animal.-  828.12.
  The city council desired to undertake further legislative
action, but Florida law prohibited a municipality from
enacting legislation relating to animal cruelty that con-
flicted with state law.  828.27(4).  To obtain clarification,
Hialeah's city attorney requested an opinion from the
attorney general of Florida as to whether 828.12 prohib-
ited -a religious group from sacrificing an animal in a
religious ritual or practice- and whether the city could
enact ordinances -making religious animal sacrifice
unlawful.-  The attorney general responded in mid-July.
He concluded that the -ritual sacrifice of animals for
purposes other than food consumption- was not a -neces-
sary- killing and so was prohibited by 828.12.  Fla. Op.
Atty. Gen. 87-56, Annual Report of the Atty. Gen. 146,
147, 149 (1988).  The attorney general appeared to define
-unnecessary- as -done without any useful motive, in a
spirit of wanton cruelty or for the mere pleasure of
destruction without being in any sense beneficial or useful
to the person killing the animal.-  Id., at 149, n. 11.  He
advised that religious animal sacrifice was against state
law, so that a city ordinance prohibiting it would not be
in conflict.  Id., at 151.
  The city council responded at first with a hortatory
enactment, Resolution 87-90, that noted its residents'
-great concern regarding the possibility of public ritualistic
animal sacrifices- and the state law prohibition.  The
resolution declared the city policy -to oppose the ritual
sacrifices of animals- within Hialeah and announced that
any person or organization practicing animal sacrifice -will
be prosecuted.-
  In September 1987, the city council adopted three
substantive ordinances addressing the issue of religious
animal sacrifice.  Ordinance 87-52 defined -sacrifice- as
-to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an
animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for
the primary purpose of food consumption,- and prohibited
owning or possessing an animal -intending to use such
animal for food purposes.-  It restricted application of this
prohibition, however, to any individual or group that
-kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of
ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of
the animal is to be consumed.-  The ordinance contained
an exemption for slaughtering by -licensed establish-
ment[s]- of animals -specifically raised for food purposes.-
Declaring, moreover, that the city council -has determined
that the sacrificing of animals within the city limits is
contrary to the public health, safety, welfare and morals
of the community,- the city council adopted Ordinance
87-71.  That ordinance defined sacrifice as had Ordinance
87-52, and then provided that -[i]t shall be unlawful for
any person, persons, corporations or associations to
sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the
City of Hialeah, Florida.-  The final Ordinance, 87-72,
defined -slaughter- as -the killing of animals for food- and
prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned for slaughter-
house use.  The ordinance provided an exemption, how-
ever, for the slaughter or processing for sale of -small
numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with
an exemption provided by state law.-  All ordinances and
resolutions passed the city council by unanimous vote.
Violations of each of the four ordinances were punishable
by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding
60 days, or both.
  Following enactment of these ordinances, the Church
and Pichardo filed this action pursuant to 42 U. S. C.
1983 in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida.  Named as defendants were the
city of Hialeah and its mayor and members of its city
council in their individual capacities.  Alleging violations
of petitioners' rights under, inter alia, the Free Exercise
Clause, the complaint sought a declaratory judgment and
injunctive and monetary relief.  The District Court
granted summary judgment to the individual defendants,
finding that they had absolute immunity for their legisla-
tive acts and that the ordinances and resolutions adopted
by the council did not constitute an official policy of
harassment, as alleged by petitioners.  688 F. Supp. 1522
(SD Fla. 1988).
  After a 9-day bench trial on the remaining claims, the
District Court ruled for the city, finding no violation of
petitioners' rights under the Free Exercise Clause.  723
F. Supp. 1467 (SD Fla. 1989).  (The court rejected as well
petitioners' other claims, which are not at issue here.)
Although acknowledging that -the ordinances are not
religiously neutral,- id., at 1476, and that the city's
concern about animal sacrifice was -prompted- by the
establishment of the Church in the city, id., at 1479, the
District Court concluded that the purpose of the ordi-
nances was not to exclude the Church from the city but
to end the practice of animal sacrifice, for whatever reason
practiced, id., at 1479, 1483.  The court also found that
the ordinances did not target religious conduct -on their
face,- though it noted that in any event -specifically
regulating [religious] conduct- does not violate the First
Amendment -when [the conduct] is deemed inconsistent
with public health and welfare.-  Id., at 1483-1484.
Thus, the court concluded that, at most, the ordinances'
effect on petitioners' religious conduct was -incidental to
[their] secular purpose and effect.-  Id., at 1484.
  The District Court proceeded to determine whether the
governmental interests underlying the ordinances were
compelling and, if so, to balance the -governmental and
religious interests.-  The court noted that -[t]his `balance
depends upon the cost to the government of altering its
activity to allow the religious practice to continue unim-
peded versus the cost to the religious interest imposed by
the government activity.'-  Ibid., quoting Grosz v. City of
Miami Beach, 721 F. 2d 729, 734 (CA11 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U. S. 827 (1984).  The court found four com-
pelling interests.  First, the court found that animal
sacrifices present a substantial health risk, both to
participants and the general public.  According to the
court, animals that are to be sacrificed are often kept in
unsanitary conditions and are uninspected, and animal
remains are found in public places.  723 F. Supp., at
1474-1475, 1485.  Second, the court found emotional
injury to children who witness the sacrifice of animals.
Id., at 1475-1476, 1485-1486.  Third, the court found
compelling the city's interest in protecting animals from
cruel and unnecessary killing.  The court determined that
the method of killing used in Santeria sacrifice was
-unreliable and not humane, and that the animals, before
being sacrificed, are often kept in conditions that produce
a great deal of fear and stress in the animal.-  Id., at
1472-1473, 1486.  Fourth, the District Court found
compelling the city's interest in restricting the slaughter
or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse
use.  Id., at 1486.  This legal determination was not
accompanied by factual findings.
  Balancing the competing governmental and religious
interests, the District Court concluded the compelling
governmental interests -fully justify the absolute prohibi-
tion on ritual sacrifice- accomplished by the ordinances.
Id., at 1487.  The court also concluded that an exception
to the sacrifice prohibition for religious conduct would
-`unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental
interest'- because any more narrow restrictions-e.g.,
regulation of disposal of animal carcasses-would be
unenforceable as a result of the secret nature of the
Santeria religion.  Id., at 1486-1487, and nn. 57-59.  A
religious exemption from the city's ordinances, concluded
the court, would defeat the city's compelling interests in
enforcing the prohibition.  Id., at 1487.
  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion.  Judgt. order
reported at 936 F. 2d 586 (1991).  Choosing not to rely
on the District Court's recitation of a compelling interest
in promoting the welfare of children, the Court of Appeals
stated simply that it concluded the ordinances were
consistent with the Constitution.  App. to Pet. for Cert.
A2.  It declined to address the effect of Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S.
872 (1990), decided after the District Court's opinion,
because the District Court -employed an arguably stricter
standard- than that applied in Smith.  App. to Pet. for
Cert. A2, n. 1.
                           II
  The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
which has been applied to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S.
296, 303 (1940), provides that -Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .-  U. S. Const., Amdt. 1
(emphasis added).  The city does not argue that Santeria
is not a -religion- within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment.  Nor could it.  Although the practice of animal
sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, -religious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensi-
ble to others in order to merit First Amendment protec-
tion.-  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment
Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 714 (1981).  Given the
historical association between animal sacrifice and reli-
gious worship, see supra, at 2, petitioners' assertion that
animal sacrifice is an integral part of their religion
-cannot be deemed bizarre or incredible.-  Frazee v.
Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U. S. 829, 834,
n. 2 (1989).  Neither the city nor the courts below,
moreover, have questioned the sincerity of petitioners' pro-
fessed desire to conduct animal sacrifices for religious
reasons.  We must consider petitioners' First Amendment
claim.
  In addressing the constitutional protection for free
exercise of religion, our cases establish the general propo-
sition that a law that is neutral and of general applicabili-
ty need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.  Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, supra.
Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and,
as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not
been satisfied.  A law failing to satisfy these requirements
must be justified by a compelling governmental interest
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.
These ordinances fail to satisfy the Smith requirements.
We begin by discussing neutrality.

                            A
  In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated
the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official
purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion
in general.  See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Westside Community
Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 248 (1990)
(plurality opinion); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473
U. S. 373, 389 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 56
(1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106-107
(1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U. S.
203, 225 (1963); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330
U. S. 1, 15-16 (1947).  These cases, however, for the most
part have addressed governmental efforts to benefit
religion or particular religions, and so have dealt with a
question different, at least in its formulation and empha-
sis, from the issue here.  Petitioners allege an attempt to
disfavor their religion because of the religious ceremonies
it commands, and the Free Exercise Clause is dispositive
in our analysis.
  At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise
Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against
some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits
conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.
See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 607 (1961)
(plurality opinion); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67,
69-70 (1953).  Indeed, it was -historical instances of
religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to
those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.-  Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U. S. 693, 703 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C. J.).
See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 991-992 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint
1987); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 467 (1868)
(reprint 1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 464,
and n. 2 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Douglas v.
Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring in result); Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342 (1890).
These principles, though not often at issue in our Free
Exercise Clause cases, have played a role in some.  In
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978), for example, we
invalidated a State law that disqualified members of the
clergy from holding certain public offices, because it
-impose[d] special disabilities on the basis of . . . religious
status,- Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 877.  On the same princi-
ple, in Fowler v. Rhode Island, supra, we found that a
municipal ordinance was applied in an unconstitutional
manner when interpreted to prohibit preaching in a public
park by a Jehovah's Witness but to permit preaching
during the course of a Catholic mass or Protestant church
service.  See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268,
272-273 (1951).  Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228
(1982) (state statute that treated some religious denomina-
tions more favorably than others violated the Establish-
ment Clause).
                            1
  Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is
never permissible, McDaniel v. Paty, supra, at 626 (plural-
ity opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 303-304,
if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is
not neutral, see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Re-
sources of Oregon v. Smith, supra, at 878-879; and it is
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and
is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.  There are,
of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object or
purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious
conduct.  To determine the object of a law, we must begin
with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality
is that a law not discriminate on its face.  A law lacks
facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without
a secular meaning discernable from the language or
context.  Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances
fail this test of facial neutrality because they use the
words -sacrifice- and -ritual,- words with strong religious
connotations.  Brief for Petitioners 16-17.  We agree that
these words are consistent with the claim of facial dis-
crimination, but the argument is not conclusive.  The
words -sacrifice- and -ritual- have a religious origin, but
current use admits also of secular meanings.  See Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary 1961, 1996
(1971).  See also 12 The Encyclopedia of Religion, at 556
(-[T]he word sacrifice ultimately became very much a
secular term in common usage-).  The ordinances, further-
more, define -sacrifice- in secular terms, without referring
to religious practices.
  We reject the contention advanced by the city, see Brief
for Respondent 15, that our inquiry must end with the
text of the laws at issue.  Facial neutrality is not determi-
native.  The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment
Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination.  The Clause
-forbids subtle departures from neutrality,- Gillette v.
United States, 401 U. S. 437, 452 (1971), and -covert
suppression of particular religious beliefs,- Bowen v. Roy,
supra, at 703 (opinion of Burger, C. J.).  Official action
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment
cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the require-
ment of facial neutrality.  The Free Exercise Clause
protects against governmental hostility which is masked,
as well as overt.  -The Court must survey meticulously
the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate,
as it were, religious gerrymanders.-  Walz v. Tax Comm'n
of New York City, 397 U. S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
  The record in this case compels the conclusion that
suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship
service was the object of the ordinances.  First, though
use of the words -sacrifice- and -ritual- does not compel
a finding of improper targeting of the Santeria religion,
the choice of these words is support for our conclusion.
There are further respects in which the text of the city
council's enactments discloses the improper attempt to
target Santeria.  Resolution 87-66, adopted June 9, 1987,
recited that -residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah
have expressed their concern that certain religions may
propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with
public morals, peace or safety,- and -reiterate[d]- the city's
commitment to prohibit -any and all [such] acts of any
and all religious groups.-  No one suggests, and on this
record it cannot be maintained, that city officials had in
mind a religion other than Santeria.
  It becomes evident that these ordinances target Santeria
sacrifice when the ordinances' operation is considered.
Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real opera-
tion is strong evidence of its object.  To be sure, adverse
impact will not always lead to a finding of impermissible
targeting.  For example, a social harm may have been a
legitimate concern of government for reasons quite apart
from discrimination.  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S.,
at 442.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145
(1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890).  See also
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Consti-
tutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205, 1319 (1970).  The
subject at hand does implicate, of course, multiple con-
cerns unrelated to religious animosity, for example, the
suffering or mistreatment visited upon the sacrificed
animals, and health hazards from improper disposal.  But
the ordinances when considered together disclose an object
remote from these legitimate concerns.  The design of
these laws accomplishes instead a -religious gerrymander,-
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, at 696
(Harlan, J., concurring), an impermissible attempt to
target petitioners and their religious practices.
  It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct
subject to Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71 is the
religious exercise of Santeria church members.  The texts
show that they were drafted in tandem to achieve this
result.  We begin with Ordinance 87-71.  It prohibits the
sacrifice of animals but defines sacrifice as -to unnecessar-
ily kill . . . an animal in a public or private ritual or
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consump-
tion.-  The definition excludes almost all killings of
animals except for religious sacrifice, and the primary
purpose requirement narrows the proscribed category even
further, in particular by exempting Kosher slaughter, see
723 F. Supp., at 1480.  We need not discuss whether this
differential treatment of two religions is itself an indepen-
dent constitutional violation.  Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456
U. S., at 244-246.  It suffices to recite this feature of the
law as support for our conclusion that Santeria alone was
the exclusive legislative concern.  The net result of the
gerrymander is that few if any killings of animals are
prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which is pro-
scribed because it occurs during a ritual or ceremony and
its primary purpose is to make an offering to the orishas,
not food consumption.  Indeed, careful drafting ensured
that, although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, killings that
are no more necessary or humane in almost all other
circumstances are unpunished.
  Operating in similar fashion is Ordinance 87-52, which
prohibits the -possess[ion], sacrifice, or slaughter- of an
animal with the -inten[t] to use such animal for food
purposes.-  This prohibition, extending to the keeping of
an animal as well as the killing itself, applies if the
animal is killed in -any type of ritual- and there is an
intent to use the animal for food, whether or not it is in
fact consumed for food.  The ordinance exempts, however,
-any licensed [food] establishment- with regard to -any
animals which are specifically raised for food purposes,-
if the activity is permitted by zoning and other laws.
This exception, too, seems intended to cover Kosher
slaughter.  Again, the burden of the ordinance, in prac-
tical terms, falls on Santeria adherents but almost no
others: If the killing is-unlike most Santeria sacri-
fices-unaccompanied by the intent to use the animal for
food, then it is not prohibited by Ordinance 87-52; if the
killing is specifically for food but does not occur during
the course of -any type of ritual,- it again falls outside the
prohibition; and if the killing is for food and occurs during
the course of a ritual, it is still exempted if it occurs in
a properly zoned and licensed establishment and involves
animals -specifically raised for food purposes.-  A pattern
of exemptions parallels the pattern of narrow prohibitions.
Each contributes to the gerrymander.
  Ordinance 87-40 incorporates the Florida animal cruelty
statute, Fla. Stat. 828.12 (1987).  Its prohibition is broad
on its face, punishing -[w]hoever . . . unnecessarily . . .
kills any animal.-  The city claims that this ordinance is
the epitome of a neutral prohibition.  Brief for Respondent
13-14.  The problem, however, is the interpretation given
to the ordinance by respondent and the Florida attorney
general.  Killings for religious reasons are deemed unnec-
essary, whereas most other killings fall outside the
prohibition.  The city, on what seems to be a per se basis,
deems hunting, slaughter of animals for food, eradication
of insects and pests, and euthanasia as necessary.  See
id., at 22.  There is no indication in the record that
respondent has concluded that hunting or fishing for sport
is unnecessary.  Indeed, one of the few reported Florida
cases decided under 828.12 concludes that the use of live
rabbits to train greyhounds is not unnecessary.  See Kiper
v. State, 310 So. 2d 42 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 328
So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1975).  Further, because it requires an
evaluation of the particular justification for the killing,
this ordinance represents a system of -individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct,- Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 884.  As we noted in
Smith, in circumstances in which individualized exemp-
tions from a general requirement are available, the
government -may not refuse to extend that system to
cases of `religious hardship' without compelling reason.-
Id., at 884, quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U. S., at 708
(opinion of Burger, C. J.).  Respondent's application of the
ordinance's test of necessity devalues religious reasons for
killing by judging them to be of lesser import than
nonreligious reasons.  Thus, religious practice is being
singled out for discriminatory treatment.  Bowen v. Roy,
supra, at 722, and n. 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in result); United States v. Lee, 455
U. S. 252, 264, n. 3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment); Bowen v. Roy, supra, at 708 (opinion of Burger,
C. J.).
  We also find significant evidence of the ordinances'
improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact that
they proscribe more religious conduct than is necessary to
achieve their stated ends.  It is not unreasonable to infer,
at least when there are no persuasive indications to the
contrary, that a law which visits -gratuitous restrictions-
on religious conduct, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S.,
at 520 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), seeks not to effectuate
the stated governmental interests, but to suppress the
conduct because of its religious motivation.
  The legitimate governmental interests in protecting the
public health and preventing cruelty to animals could be
addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat
prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice.  If im-
proper disposal, not the sacrifice itself, is the harm to be
prevented, the city could have imposed a general regula-
tion on the disposal of organic garbage.  It did not do so.
Indeed, counsel for the city conceded at oral argument
that, under the ordinances, Santeria sacrifices would be
illegal even if they occurred in licensed, inspected, and
zoned slaughterhouses.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 45.  See also id.,
at 42, 48.  Thus, these broad ordinances prohibit Santeria
sacrifice even when it does not threaten the city's interest
in the public health.  The District Court accepted the
argument that narrower regulation would be unenforceable
because of the secrecy in the Santeria rituals and the lack
of any central religious authority to require compliance
with secular disposal regulations.  See 723 F. Supp., at
1486-1487, and nn. 58-59.  It is difficult to understand,
however, how a prohibition of the sacrifices themselves,
which occur in private, is enforceable if a ban on improper
disposal, which occurs in public, is not.  The neutrality of
a law is suspect if First Amendment freedoms are cur-
tailed to prevent isolated collateral harms not themselves
prohibited by direct regulation.  See, e.g., Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939).
  Under similar analysis, narrower regulation would
achieve the city's interest in preventing cruelty to animals.
With regard to the city's interest in ensuring the adequate
care of animals, regulation of conditions and treatment,
regardless of why an animal is kept, is the logical re-
sponse to the city's concern, not a prohibition on posses-
sion for the purpose of sacrifice.  The same is true for the
city's interest in prohibiting cruel methods of killing.
Under federal and Florida law and Ordinance 87-40,
which incorporates Florida law in this regard, killing an
animal by the -simultaneous and instantaneous severance
of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument--the
method used in Kosher slaughter-is approved as humane.
See 7 U. S. C. 1902(b); Fla. Stat. 828.23(7)(b) (1991);
Ordinance 87-40, 1.  The District Court found that,
though Santeria sacrifice also results in severance of the
carotid arteries, the method used during sacrifice is less
reliable and therefore not humane.  See 723 F. Supp., at
1472-1473.  If the city has a real concern that other
methods are less humane, however, the subject of the
regulation should be the method of slaughter itself, not
a religious classification that is said to bear some general
relation to it.
  Ordinance 87-72-unlike the three other ordinances-
does appear to apply to substantial nonreligious conduct
and not to be overbroad.  For our purposes here, however,
the four substantive ordinances may be treated as a group
for neutrality purposes.  Ordinance 87-72 was passed the
same day as Ordinance 87-71 and was enacted, as were
the three others, in direct response to the opening of the
Church.  It would be implausible to suggest that the three
other ordinances, but not Ordinance 87-72, had as their
object the suppression of religion.  We need not decide
whether the Ordinance 87-72 could survive constitutional
scrutiny if it existed separately; it must be invalidated
because it functions, with the rest of the enactments in
question, to suppress Santeria religious worship.

                            2
  In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one
under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance
in our equal protection cases.  As Justice Harlan noted in
the related context of the Establishment Clause, -[n]eut-
rality in its application requires an equal protection mode
of analysis.-  Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397
U. S., at 696 (concurring opinion).  Here, as in equal
protection cases, we may determine the city council's
object from both direct and circumstantial evidence.
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977).  Relevant evidence
includes, among other things, the historical background
of the decision under challenge, the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in
question, as well as the legislative or administrative
history, including contemporaneous statements made by
members of the decisionmaking body.  Id., at 267-268.
These objective factors bear on the question of discrimina-
tory object.  Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S.
256, 279, n. 24 (1979).
  That the ordinances were enacted -`because of,' not
merely `in spite of,'- their suppression of Santeria reli-
gious practice, id., at 279, is revealed by the events
preceding enactment of the ordinances.  Although respond-
ent claimed at oral argument that it had experienced
significant problems resulting from the sacrifice of animals
within the city before the announced opening of the
Church, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 46, the city council made no
attempt to address the supposed problem before its
meeting in June 1987, just weeks after the Church
announced plans to open.  The minutes and taped ex-
cerpts of the June 9 session, both of which are in the
record, evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents,
members of the city council, and other city officials toward
the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice.
The public crowd that attended the June 9 meetings
interrupted statements by council members critical of
Santeria with cheers and the brief comments of Pichardo
with taunts.  When Councilman Martinez, a supporter of
the ordinances, stated that in prerevolution Cuba -people
were put in jail for practicing this religion,- the audience
applauded.
  Other statements by members of the city council were
in a similar vein.  For example, Councilman Martinez,
after noting his belief that Santeria was outlawed in
Cuba, questioned, -if we could not practice this [religion]
in our homeland [Cuba], why bring it to this country?-
Councilman Cardoso said that Santeria devotees at the
Church -are in violation of everything this country stands
for.-  Councilman Mejides indicated that he was -totally
against the sacrificing of animals- and distinguished
Kosher slaughter because it had a -real purpose.-  The
-Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice an animal for
consumption,- he continued, -but for any other purposes,
I don't believe that the Bible allows that.-  The president
of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked, -What
can we do to prevent the Church from opening?-
  Various Hialeah city officials made comparable com-
ments.  The chaplain of the Hialeah Police Department
told the city council that Santeria was a sin, -foolishness,-
-an abomination to the Lord,- and the worship of -de-
mons.-  He advised the city council that -We need to be
helping people and sharing with them the truth that is
found in Jesus Christ.-  He concluded: -I would exhort
you . . . not to permit this Church to exist.-  The city
attorney commented that Resolution 87-66 indicated that
-This community will not tolerate religious practices which
are abhorrent to its citizens . . . .-  Similar comments
were made by the deputy city attorney.  This history
discloses the object of the ordinances to target animal
sacrifice by Santeria worshippers because of its religious
motivation.
                            3
  In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion:
The ordinances had as their object the suppression of
religion.  The pattern we have recited discloses animosity
to Santeria adherents and their religious practices; the
ordinances by their own terms target this religious
exercise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered
with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to
exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances
suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary
in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their
defense.  These ordinances are not neutral, and the court
below committed clear error in failing to reach this
conclusion.
                            B
  We turn next to a second requirement of the Free
Exercise Clause, the rule that laws burdening religious
practice must be of general applicability.  Employment
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U. S., at 879-881.  All laws are selective to some
extent, but categories of selection are of paramount
concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening
religious practice.  The Free Exercise Clause -protect[s]
religious observers against unequal treatment,- Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136,
148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), and
inequality results when a legislature decides that the
governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy
of being pursued only against conduct with a religious
motivation.
  The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate
interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens
only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential
to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free
Exercise Clause.  The principle underlying the general
applicability requirement has parallels in our First
Amendment jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 501 U. S. ___, ___-___ (1991) (slip op., at 5-6);
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U. S. 182, 201
(1990); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 585 (1983); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U. S., at 245-246; Presbyterian Church in
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U. S. 440, 449 (1969).  In this
case we need not define with precision the standard used
to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application,
for these ordinances fall well below the minimum stan-
dard necessary to protect First Amendment rights.
  Respondent claims that Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and
87-71 advance two interests: protecting the public health
and preventing cruelty to animals.  The ordinances are
underinclusive for those ends.  They fail to prohibit non-
religious conduct that endangers these interests in a
similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.
The underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential.
Despite the city's proffered interest in preventing cruelty
to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid
few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice.
Many types of animal deaths or kills for nonreligious
reasons are either not prohibited or approved by express
provision.  For example, fishing-which occurs in Hialeah,
see A. Khedouri & F. Khedouri, South Florida Inside Out
57 (1991)-is legal.  Extermination of mice and rats
within a home is also permitted.  Florida law incorporated
by Ordinance 87-40 sanctions euthanasia of -stray,
neglected, abandoned, or unwanted animals,- Fla. Stat.
828.058 (1987); destruction of animals judicially removed
from their owners -for humanitarian reasons- or when the
animal -is of no commercial value,- 828.073(4)(c)(2); the
infliction of pain or suffering -in the interest of medical
science,- 828.02; the placing of poison in one's yard or
enclosure, 828.08; and the use of a live animal -to
pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any hunting,-
828.122(6)(b), and -to hunt wild hogs,- 828.122(6)(e).
  The city concedes that -neither the State of Florida nor
the City has enacted a generally applicable ban on the
killing of animals.-  Brief for Respondent 21.  It asserts,
however, that animal sacrifice is -different- from the
animal killings that are permitted by law.  Ibid.  Accord-
ing to the city, it is -self-evident- that killing animals for
food is -important-; the eradication of insects and pests
is -obviously justified-; and the euthanasia of excess
animals -makes sense.-  Id., at 22.  These ipse dixits do
not explain why religion alone must bear the burden of
the ordinances, when many of these secular killings fall
within the city's interest in preventing the cruel treatment
of animals.
  The ordinances are also underinclusive with regard to
the city's interest in public health, which is threatened by
the disposal of animal carcasses in open public places and
the consumption of uninspected meat, see Brief for Re-
spondent 32, citing 723 F. Supp., at 1474-1475, 1485.
Neither interest is pursued by respondent with regard to
conduct that is not motivated by religious conviction.  The
health risks posed by the improper disposal of animal
carcasses are the same whether Santeria sacrifice or some
nonreligious killing preceded it.  The city does not,
however, prohibit hunters from bringing their kill to their
houses, nor does it regulate disposal after their activity.
Despite substantial testimony at trial that the same public
health hazards result from improper disposal of garbage
by restaurants, see 11 Record 566, 590-591, restaurants
are outside the scope of the ordinances.  Improper disposal
is a general problem that causes substantial health risks,
723 F. Supp., at 1485, but which respondent addresses
only when it results from religious exercise.
  The ordinances are underinclusive as well with regard
to the health risk posed by consumption of uninspected
meat.  Under the city's ordinances, hunters may eat their
kill and fisherman may eat their catch without undergoing
governmental inspection.  Likewise, state law requires
inspection of meat that is sold but exempts meat from
animals raised for the use of the owner and -members of
his household and nonpaying guests and employees.-  Fla.
Stat. 585.88(1)(a) (1991).  The asserted interest in
inspected meat is not pursued in contexts similar to that
of religious animal sacrifice.
  Ordinance 87-72, which prohibits the slaughter of
animals outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses, is
underinclusive on its face.  The ordinance includes an
exemption for -any person, group, or organization- that
-slaughters or processes for sale, small numbers of hogs
and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption
provided by state law.-  See Fla. Stat. 828.24(3) (1991).
Respondent has not explained why commercial operations
that slaughter -small numbers- of hogs and cattle do not
implicate its professed desire to prevent cruelty to animals
and preserve the public health.  Although the city has
classified Santeria sacrifice as slaughter, subjecting it to
this ordinance, it does not regulate other killings for food
in like manner.
  We conclude, in sum, that each of Hialeah's ordinances
pursues the city's governmental interests only against
conduct motivated by religious belief.  The ordinances
-ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that society is
prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not
upon itself.-  The Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U. S. 524,
542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).  This precise evil is what the requirement
of general applicability is designed to prevent.

                           III
  A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral
or not of general application must undergo the most
rigorous of scrutiny.  To satisfy the commands of the First
Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must
advance -`interests of the highest order'- and must be
narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.  McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U. S., at 628, quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 215 (1972).  The compelling interest standard
that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith require-
ments is not -water[ed] . . . down- but -really means what
it says.-  Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S., at 888.  A law that targets
religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances
legitimate governmental interests only against conduct
with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only
in rare cases.  It follows from what we have already said
that these ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.
  First, even were the governmental interests compelling,
the ordinances are not drawn in narrow terms to accom-
plish those interests.  As we have discussed, see supra,
at 16-18, 21-24, all four ordinances are overbroad or
underinclusive in substantial respects.  The proffered
objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous non-
religious conduct, and those interests could be achieved
by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far
lesser degree.  The absence of narrow tailoring suffices to
establish the invalidity of the ordinances.  See Arkansas
Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 232
(1987).
  Respondent has not demonstrated, moreover, that, in the
context of these ordinances, its governmental interests are
compelling.  Where government restricts only conduct pro-
tected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible
measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial
harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given
in justification of the restriction is not compelling.  It is
established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that -a law
cannot be regarded as protecting an interest `of the high-
est order' . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that
supposedly vital interest unprohibited.-  The Florida Star
v. B. J. F., supra, at 541-542 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (citation omitted).  See
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. ___, ___-___ (1991) (slip op.,
at 12-13).  Cf. The Florida Star v. B. J. F., supra, at
540-541; Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S.
97, 104-105 (1979); id., at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in judgment).  As we show above, see supra, at 21-24, the
ordinances are underinclusive to a substantial extent with
respect to each of the interests that respondent has
asserted, and it is only conduct motivated by religious
conviction that bears the weight of the governmental
restrictions.  There can be no serious claim that those
interests justify the ordinances.

                           IV
  The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to
religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that
proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to
religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause
to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and
to the rights it secures.  Those in office must be resolute
in resisting importunate demands and must ensure that
the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and
regulation are secular.  Legislators may not devise mecha-
nisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress
a religion or its practices.  The laws here in question were
enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and
they are void.
                                              Reversed.
            APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

  City of Hialeah, Florida, Resolution No. 87-66, adopted
June 9, 1987, provides:
      -WHEREAS, residents and citizens of the City of
Hialeah have expressed their concern that certain
religions may propose to engage in practices which
are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,
and
      -WHEREAS, the Florida Constitution, Article I,
Declaration of Rights, Section 3, Religious Freedom,
specifically states that religious freedom shall not
justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace
or safety.
      -NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
      -1.  The City reiterates its commitment to a prohi-
bition against any and all acts of any and all religious
groups which are inconsistent with public morals,
peace or safety.-

  City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-40, adopted
June 9, 1987, provides:
      -WHEREAS, the citizens of the City of Hialeah,
Florida, have expressed great concern over the poten-
tial for animal sacrifices being conducted in the City
of Hialeah; and
      -WHEREAS, Section 828.27, Florida Statutes,
provides that `nothing contained in this section shall
prevent any county or municipality from enacting any
ordinance relating to animal control or cruelty to
animals which is identical to the provisions of this
Chapter . . . except as to penalty.'
      -NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
      -Section 1.  The Mayor and City Council of the City
of Hialeah, Florida, hereby adopt Florida Statute,
Chapter 828-`Cruelty to Animals' (copy attached
hereto and made a part hereof), in its entirety (relat-
ing to animal control or cruelty to animals), except as
to penalty.
      -Section 2.  Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.
      -All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict
herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such
conflict.
      -Section 3.  Penalties.
      -Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violat-
ing the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished
by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence,
not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discre-
tion of the Court.
      -Section 4.  Inclusion in Code.
      -The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included
and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah,
as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sec-
tions of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to
conform to the uniform numbering system of the
Code.
      -Section 5.  Severability Clause.
      -If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or
unconstitutional by the judge or decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or unconstitu-
tionality shall not effect any of the remaining phrases,
clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of this
ordinance.
      -Section 6.  Effective Date.
      -This Ordinance shall become effective when passed
by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed
by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.-

  City of Hialeah Resolution 87-90, adopted August 11,
1987, provides:
      -WHEREAS, the residents and citizens of the City
of Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great concern
regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal
sacrifices in the City of Hialeah, Florida; and
      -WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has
received an opinion from the Attorney General of the
State of Florida, concluding that public ritualistic
animal sacrifices is [sic] a violation of the Florida
State Statute on Cruelty to Animals; and
      -WHEREAS, the Attorney General further held that
the sacrificial killing of animals other than for the
primary purpose of food consumption is prohibited
under state law; and
      -WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has
enacted an ordinance mirroring state law prohibiting
cruelty to animals.
      -NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
      -Section 1.  It is the policy of the Mayor and City
Council of the City of Hialeah, Florida, to oppose the
ritual sacrifices of animals within the City of Hialeah,
FLorida [sic].  Any individual or organization that
seeks to practice animal sacrifice in violation of state
and local law will be prosecuted.-

  City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance 87-52, adopted
September 8, 1987, provides:
      -WHEREAS, the residents and citizens of the City
of Hialeah, Florida, have expressed great concern
regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal
sacrifices within the City of Hialeah, Florida; and
      -WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has
received an opinion from the Attorney General of the
State of Florida, concluding that public ritualistic
animal sacrifice, other than for the primary purpose
of food consumption, is a violation of state law; and
      -WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, has
enacted an ordinance (Ordinance No. 87-40), mirror-
ing the state law prohibiting cruelty to animals.
      -WHEREAS, the City of Hialeah, Florida, now
wishes to specifically prohibit the possession of ani-
mals for slaughter or sacrifice within the City of
Hialeah, Florida.
      -NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
      -Section 1.  Chapter 6 of the Code of Ordinances of
the City of Hialeah, Florida, is hereby amended by
adding thereto two (2) new Sections 6-8 `Definitions'
and 6-9 `Prohibition Against Possession Of Animals
For Slaughter Or Sacrifice', which is to read as
follows:
      -Section 6-8.  Definitions
      -1.  Animal-any living dumb creature.
      -2.  Sacrifice-to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture,
or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or
ceremony not for the primary purpose of food con-
sumption.
      -3.  Slaughter-the killing of animals for food.
      -Section 6-9.  Prohibition Against Possession of
Animals for Slaughter Or Sacrifice.
      -1.  No person shall own, keep or otherwise possess,
sacrifice, or slaughter any sheep, goat, pig, cow or the
young of such species, poultry, rabbit, dog, cat, or any
other animal, intending to use such animal for food
purposes.
      -2.  This section is applicable to any group or
individual that kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals
for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not
the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed.
      -3.  Nothing in this ordinance is to be interpreted
as prohibiting any licensed establishment from slaugh-
tering for food purposes any animals which are
specifically raised for food purposes where such
activity is properly zoned and/or permitted under state
and local law and under rules promulgated by the
Florida Department of Agriculture.
      -Section 2.  Repeal of Ordinance in Conflict.
      -All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict
herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such
conflict.
      -Section 3.  Penalties.
      -Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violat-
ing the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished
by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence,
not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discre-
tion of the Court.
      -Section 4.  Inclusion in Code.
      -The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included
and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah,
as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sec-
tions of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to
conform to the uniform numbering system of the
Code.
      -Section 5.  Severability Clause.
      -If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or
unconstitutional by the judgement or decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or unconsti-
tutionality shall not effect any of the remaining
phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of
this ordinance.
      -Section 6.  Effective Date.
      -This Ordinance shall become effective when passed
by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed
by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.-

  City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance 87-71, adopted
September 22, 1987, provides:
      -WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Hia-
leah, Florida, has determined that the sacrificing of
animals within the city limits is contrary to the public
health, safety, welfare and morals of the community;
and
      -WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Hia-
leah, Florida, desires to have qualified societies or
corporations organized under the laws of the State of
Florida, to be authorized to investigate and prosecute
any violation(s) of the ordinance herein after set forth,
and for the registration of the agents of said societies.
      -NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
      -Section 1.  For the purpose of this ordinance, the
word sacrifice shall mean: to unnecessarily kill,
torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or
private ritual or ceremony not for the primary pur-
pose of food consumption.
      -Section 2.  For the purpose of this ordinance, the
word animal shall mean: any living dumb creature.
      -Section 3.  It shall be unlawful for any person,
persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any
animal within the corporate limits of the City of
Hialeah, Florida.
      -Section 4.  All societies or associations for the
prevention of cruelty to animals organized under the
laws of the State of Florida, seeking to register with
the City of Hialeah for purposes of investigating and
assisting in the prosecution of violations and provi-
sions [sic] of this Ordinance, shall apply to the City
Council for authorization to so register and shall be
registered with the Office of the Mayor of the City of
Hialeah, Florida, following approval by the City
Council at a public hearing in accordance with rules
and regulations (i.e., criteria) established by the City
Council by resolution, and shall thereafter, be empow-
ered to assist in the prosection of any violation of this
Ordinance.
      -Section 5.  Any society or association for the
prevention of cruelty to animals registered with the
Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 4 hereinabove, may
appoint agents for the purposes of investigating and
assisting in the prosection of violations and provisions
[sic] of this Ordinance, or any other laws of the City
of Hialeah, Florida, for the purpose of protecting
animals and preventing any act prohibited hereunder.
      -Section 6.  Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.
      -All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict
herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such
conflict.
      -Section 7.  Penalties.
      -Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violat-
ing the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished
by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence,
not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discre-
tion of the Court.
      -Section 8.  Inclusion in Code.
      -The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included
and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah,
as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sec-
tions of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to
conform to the uniform numbering system of the
Code.
      -Section 9.  Severability Clause.
      -If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or
unconstitutional by the judgment or decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or unconsti-
tutionality shall not effect any of the remaining
phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of
this Ordinance.
      -Section 10.  Effective Date.
      -This Ordinance shall become effective when passed
by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed
by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.-

  City of Hialeah, Florida, Ordinance No. 87-72, adopted
September 22, 1987, provides:
      -WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Hia-
leah, Florida, has determined that the slaughtering
of animals on the premises other than those properly
zoned as a slaughter house, is contrary to the public
health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Hialeah,
Florida.
      -NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HIALEAH, FLORIDA, that:
      -Section 1.  For the purpose of this Ordinance, the
word slaughter shall mean: the killing of animals for
food.
      -Section 2.  For the purpose of this Ordinance, the
word animal shall mean: any living dumb creature.
      -Section 3.  It shall be unlawful for any person,
persons, corporations or associations to slaughter any
animal on any premises in the City of Hialeah,
Florida, except those properly zoned as a slaughter
house, and meeting all the health, safety and sanita-
tion codes prescribed by the City for the operation of
a slaughter house.
      -Section 4.  All societies or associations for the
prevention of cruelty to animals organized under the
laws of the State of Florida, seeking to register with
the City of Hialeah for purposes of investigating and
assisting in the prosecution of violations and provi-
sions [sic] of this Ordinance, shall apply to the City
Council for authorization to so register and shall be
registered with the Office of the Mayor of the City of
Hialeah, Florida, following approval by the City
Council at a public hearing in accordance with rules
and regulations (i.e., criteria) established by the City
Council by resolution, and shall thereafter, be empow-
ered to assist in the prosection of any violations of
this Ordinance.
      -Section 5.  Any society or association for the
prevention of cruelty to animals registered with the
Mayor of the City of Hialeah, Florida, in accordance
with the provisions of Section 4 hereinabove, may
appoint agents for the purposes of investigating and
assisting in the prosection of violations and provisions
[sic] of this Ordinance, or any other laws of the City
of Hialeah, Florida, for the purpose of protecting
animals and preventing any act prohibited hereunder.
      -Section 6.  This Ordinance shall not apply to any
person, groups or organization that slaughters, or
processes for sale, small numbers of hogs and/or cattle
per week in accordance with an exemption provided
by state law.
      -Section 7.  Repeal of Ordinances in Conflict.
      -All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict
herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of such
conflict.
      -Section 8.  Penalties.
      -Any person, firm or corporation convicted of violat-
ing the provisions of this ordinance shall be punished
by a fine, not exceeding $500.00, or by a jail sentence,
not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both, in the discre-
tion of the Court.
      -Section 9.  Inclusion in Code.
      -The provisions of this Ordinance shall be included
and incorporated in the Code of the City of Hialeah,
as an addition or amendment thereto, and the sec-
tions of this Ordinance shall be re-numbered to
conform to the uniform numbering system of the
Code.
      -Section 10.  Severability Clause.
      -If any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or
section of this Ordinance shall be declared invalid or
unconstitutional by the judgment or decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity or unconsti-
tutionality shall not effect any of the remaining
phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs or sections of
this ordinance.
      -Section 11.  Effective Date.
      -This Ordinance shall become effective when passed
by the City Council of the City of Hialeah and signed
by the Mayor of the City of Hialeah.-